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Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages
ABSTRACT
The present paper examines the reservation wages reported by a large
sample of unemployed individuals in the United States in May 1976. The majority
of unemployedindividuals report reservation wages that are at least as high
as the wage they were paid on their last job. Approximately one—fourth of all
job seekers required a wage that is at least 10 percent higher than the wage on
their previous job.
Our econometric evidence shows that the level of unemployment benefits
relative to previous wages has a powerful effect on the individual's reservation
wage. A ten percent increase in the U.I. replacement ratio increases the reser-
vation wage by aboutpercent for job losers who are not on layoff and by
somewhat less for other unemployed groups. Separate regressions to analyze the
high reservation wage per se show that a ten percent increase in the U.I. replace-
mentratio also increases by about four percentage points the probability that
an unemployed individual will require a wage increase of 10 percent or more.
These estimates imply that reducing net unemployment insurance bene-
fits (by lowering gross benefits or by taxing unemployment benefits) could
significantly lower the average duration of unemployment and the relative number
of long duration spells of unemployment. Because of. the norilinear response of
the unemployment duration to the reservation wage, reducing a high unemployment
insurance ratio by ten percentage points is likely to have a greater impact on
unemployment than reducing a low unemployment insurance ratio by ten percentage
points.
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The principle imperfection in modern labor markets is the downward
rigidity of existing nominal wages. As a result, a decline in the marginal
value product of an employee's labor is likely to cause a temporary or permanent
layoff rather than a downward wage adjustment. Such separations are inefficient
because they waste job specific human capital and cause employees to work at new
jobs in which their productivity is lower than it would be if they remained at
their previous job.1
Although wage reductions on an existing job are rare, an employee who
loses his job is likely to find that the wage on his next job is lower than the
wage on the job that he lost. There are at least five reasons to expect this
wage reduction: First, the original job loss is likely to have occurred because
of a decline in the value of the employee's services. This may reflect a
deterioration of the employee's own skills, a change in available production
methods that makes existing skills less valuable, or a decline in the real price
of the product that the employee produces. Second, even if there has been no
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See Hall and Lazear (19 2) for an analysis of the inefficiency ot such
separations and of the second—best character of contracts that entail such
wage rigidities.
(051382)—2—
decline in the actual value of an employee's services, he may lose his job
because his employer accumulates enough information to decide that the value of
those services is below his wage. Third, as we have already noted, the change
in jobs is likely to involve some loss of job—specific human capital. Fourth, a
prospectiveemployer who is not able to judge the skill level of a new employee
will pay a lower wage until information accumulates. Finally, employees with
substantial job tenure nay receive wages that exceed the marginal value product
oftheirlabor while newemployees are paid less than their marginal value pro-
duct (Medoff and Abraham, 1978, and Lazear, 1931, 1982).
The actual wage on the new job depends on the job—seeker's willingness
to search and to wait. A job loser may have to wait a long time unless
he reduces his reservation wage below the wage that he received on his last job.
The more he reduces his reservation wage relative to his previous wage, the
sooner the job loser can expect to find new work.'
The traditional distinction between voluntary and involuntary
unemployment pushes this notion to the extreme and classifies an individual as
voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed according to whether or not he is
willing to work at a wage that is less than or equal to his previous wage. The
search theory model of unemployment2 implies that this two—way classification is
less meaningful than using the individual's reservation wage as a continuous
1Several empirical studies indicate thata higher relative reservation wage
reduces the probability of leaving unemployment and becoming employed (Baron
and Mellow, 1981, and Warner et al., 1980).
2See Stigler (1962) for the basic idea of thetheory. A more formal model is
presented in a number of places, e.g., McCall (1970), and Mortenson (1971).—3—
measure of the eagerness or reluctance of the job—seeker to accept employment.
Even an individual who is willing to work for less than his previouswage will
be voluntarily unemployed in the sense that he rejects wage offers below his
reservation wage. Nevertheless, a comparison of the reservation wage with the
wage on the last job is useful simply because the probability of finding an
acceptable job is likely to decline rapidly as the reservation wage exceeds the
1
previous wage.
An alternative theory mightreplacethe notion of voluntary and in-
voluntary unemployment with a comparison of the individual's reservation wage with
the socially optimal reservation wage for that individual. The socially optimal
reservation wage for an individual reflects a balancing of the gains of addi-
tional job search (measured by the increase in the individual's marginal product
in a better job) against the cost of that search (measured by the value of fore-
gone production, net of the value of leisure, during the period of additional
search.) The primary reason for the difference between the privately optimal
reservation wage and the socially optimal reservation wage is that unemployment
insurance benefits decrease the private cost of unemployment but not the social
cost of unemployment.2 Because of unemployment insurance, the privately optimal
reservation wage exceeds the socially optimal reservation wage and job search is
inefficiently prolonged.
1The startingwage is of course not the only attribute of the new job. Other
features of the job itself, expected future wage increases, pension arrange—
merits, etc., all influence the job's attractiveness. We implicitly assume that
these features do not differ between the previous job and the prospective new
job and that they vary nnotonica11y with the wage.
2The private reservationwage also reflects the income tax that reduces both
the opportunity cost of unemployment and the reward for finding a better job.
But if the marginal tax rate is constant, this effect is at most of secondary
importance.—4 —
Itwould be good to xxasure the extent to which private reservation
wages exceed the corresponding social optima and to estimate the actual effect
of unemployment insurance on this gap. Unfortunately, although data are
available on individual reservation wages, no direct observation or calculation
of socially optimal reservation wages is possible. In the present study we
therefore compare an individual's reservation wage with the wage he earned
on his previous job. The wage on the previous job is of interest in itself in
this context and can also be interpreted as an indication of the socially opti-
mal reservation wage.
The previous wage is likely to exceed the socially optimal reservation
wage for individuals who lost their previous job. By definition, a job loser
was willing to continue working for his previous employer at his previous wage.
Thus the previous wage was at least equal to the individual's previous private
reservation wage. Since unemployment insurance makes the private reservation
wage greater than the social reservation wage, the previous wage was greater
than the previous socially optimal reservation wage. Since the unemployment
itself reflects or causes a fall in the distribution of potential wade
offers,1the new socially optimal reservation wage is also lower than the pre-
vious socially optimal reservation wage. Thus the previous actual wage exceeds
the new socially optimal reservation wage.
The present paper examines the reservation wages reported by a large
sample of unemployed individuals in the United States in May 1976. At that
1The five reasons given above for a lower post—unemploymentwage can be
interpreted as reasons for a downward shift of the distribution of potential
wage offers.—5—
time,the econoniy was still recovering from the recession that ended in
March1975. The overall unemploymentrateof 6.7percentindicated that
substantialslack still remained in the labor market. We report information
separately for those individuals who are classified as job—losers and those who
report thatthey voluntarily quit their previous job. Specific attention is
givento the relative level of unemployment insurance benefits as a determinant
of the reservation wage.
A most striking finding in our analysis is that the majority of
unemployedindividuals report reservation wagesthatare at least as high as the
wage they were paid on their last job. But the median reservation wage
ratio1 is less important than the substantial fraction of job seekers who
require wages that are significantly higher than their last wage. The evidence
presented in section 3 shows that approximately one—fourth of all job seekers
require a wage that is at least 10 percent higher than the wage on their last
job. Not surprisingly, individuals who voluntarily left their previous job
generally report even higher reservation wage ratios. Fully 31 percent of job
leavers are seeking new jobs that pay at least 10 percent more than their pre-
sent wage.
Several previous studies (e.g., Baron and Mellow, 19b1, and Warner,
Poindexter and Fean, 1980 )havenoted that the nan of the reservation wage
ratio or of some closely related nasure2 is less than one and concluded that
1We use the term "reservationwage ratio" for the ratio of the reservation
wage to the wage on the individual's last job.
2The usual nasure is the ratio of the reservationwage to the wage predicted
for the individual. Section 2 discusses this ratio and the reason why it is
likely to be lower than the reservation wage ratio that we analyzed.—6—
this is consistent with the theoretical expectation that unemployedindividuals
set low reservation wages. By looking only at the average reservation wage,
these studies fail to see the largepercentageof individuals who have set
significantly high reservation wage ratios. Only Clark and Summers (1919) note
that a significant fraction of reservation wages exceed the individuals' pre-
vious wages.
The official procedure of the U.S. Department of Labor classifies an
individual as unemployed if he is not currently working and has done something in
the past four weeks to find employment. No reference is made in this criterion
of uneinploy-ment to the individual's reservation wage. Even someone whose reser-
vation wage is so high that essentialy all feasible wage offers would be
rejected is thus officially classified as unemployed. In section 2 of the pre-
sent paper we use information on the individual reservation wages to adjust the
official unemployment statistics. We define an adjusted unemployment rate by
excluding everyone whose reservation wage is above the wage on their last job.
A more conservative procedure defines an adjusted unemployment rate by excluding
those with reservation wages above 1.1 times their last wage.
The primary focus of the present research is the effect of
unemployment insurance on reservation wages. Section 5 of the paper summarizes
previous research on this subject and discusses the specification of the reser-
vation wage equations that we use to estimate the effect of unemployment
insurance. Section 6 presents parameter estimates for these equations and sec-
tion 7 discusses the implications for the expected duration of unemployment and
for the probability of long spells of unemployment. There is a brief concluding
section.2. Data and Definitions
Our analysis is based on a special study of the job search methods of
the unemployed that was conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor in May 1976.1
A total of 4,668personsin the Current Population Survey in May 1976 were
classified as unemployed and asked to fill out a special supplementary question-
naire concerning previous work experience and earnings, current job—seeking
methods and aspirations, and related questions. In many households, the form
was left to be filled in later or was mailed to the unemployed person after a
telephone interview. The nonresponse rate was 31 percent and resulted in a
total sample of 3,238 completed questionnaires. Although there is no reason to
expecta systematic bias in the sample of respondents with respect to the
questions of interest in this paper, a 31 percent nonresponse rate is clearly a
reasonfor caution in interpreting any precise numbers.
Since our interest is in the ratio of the individual's reservation
wage to his or her previous wage, we have eliminated from the Department of
Labor sample all those individuals who are classified as new entrants (who have
no previous wage) or reentrants (whose previous wage may refer to a much earlier
period). Some individuals who answered the questionnaire did not provide infor-
mation about their reservation wage or their previous wage. A smallgroup of
respondents provided such extreme answers (reservation wages that were nre
than three times their previous wage or less than one—third of their previous
wage) that we thought it best to disregard those answers as indicating that the
respondents did not understand the question or were unwilling to provide an
1See Rosenfeld (1977) fora description of the survey and a copy of the
questionnaire.—8—
answer.Our final sample contains 2,228 nen and women for whom all the required
data are available.
Our neasure of the reservation wage was based on the following pair of
questions:(1) "What kind of work were you looking for (in the period for April
18 through May 15)?" and (2) "What is the lowest wage or salaryyou would accept
(before deductions) for this type of work?" Individuals who indicated that they
were looking for more than one kind of work were asked to specify their reser-
vation wage for the type of job that they preferred.
In our basic analysis, we compare this reservation wage to the wage
that the individual describes as "the usual earnings ...beforedeductions" on
the "last job at which you worked for two consecutive weeks or more."
Individuals were also asked whether they had had a higher paying job since
January 1, 1971. Approximately one—fourth of the individuals in our sample
responded that they had had such a job and they were asked to specify their
usual earnings on that job. We also present some analysis based on the ratio of
the reservation wage to this previous highest earnings.1
Survey respondents were also asked whether they received any
unemployment insurance benefits during their current spell of unemployment.
Those who had received benefits were asked what their weekly benefit was. In
our analysis of the effect of unemployment insurance on reservation wages, we
use the ratio of this reported U.I. benefit to the highest previous wage, i.e.,
the highest wage on any other job since January 19114 including the last job.
1lndividualsmay indicate their usual earnings as a rate per hour, per week,
per month or per year. As long as the unit is the same for the reservation
wage and the previous wage, the specific choice of unit is irrelevant. When
the units are not the same, we convert by assuming 140 hours per week and
14.3weeksper month.—9—
It is important to note that our unemployment insurance variable
refers to the amount of U.I. benefits actually received during theunemployment
spell and not to the benefits to which the individual was entitled under the
law.This difference makes it very difficult to interpret the distinction bet-
ween those who receive UI. benefits and those who do not. An individualmay not
receive U.I. benefits because Ci) he is not eligible for benefits (having
exhausted benefits or had insufficient previous work experience) or because (2)
he has not yet applied for benefits or because (3) he has applied but hasnot
yet received benefits because of administrative delays in the payment of U.I.
benefits.
This last point deserves further explanation. In most states there is
a one week "waiting period" in the first unemployment spell per benefityear
before the individual becomes eligible for unemployment insurance. Buteven
after the individual is eligible for benefits and is actually accruingbenefits,
he may not be receiving those benefits because of administrativedelays in pro-
cessing payment. A significant fraction of individuals during the first few
weeks of unemployment may be accruing benefits even though they have notyet
received their first U.I. benefit checks. Such individuals should behaveas if
the net cost of unemployment is reduced by the accruing U.I. benefitseven though
they are recorded in our statistics as not receiving benefits. Since about half
of the unemployed job losers in May 1976 were in the firstweeks 01' their
unemployment spell, this is a potentially serious problem in interpreting the
receiptor non—receipt ofU.I. benefits.
The problem of interpreting the absence of U.I. benefits does not of
course apply to interpreting the ratio of U.I. benefits to wagesamong those who—10—
doreceive U.I. benefits. Our analysis of the effect of U.I. therefore concentrates
on the effect of variations in the U.I. replacement rate (i.e., the ratio of U.I.
benefits to previouswages) among the U.I. recipients. Some evidence for the
entire sample confirms thatthere are problemsofinterpreting the nonreceipt of
benefits.
3.Distribution of Reservation Wage Ratios
As we noted in the introduction, several previous studies have coin—
mented that on average reservation wages are slightly less than some measure of
potential wage. These studies have failed, however, to note that significant
variation of the reservation wage ratio around its average implies that a
substantial fraction of employees have reservation wages that exceed their
potential wage. The present study examines the full distribution of reservation
wages and shows that about one—third of the unemployed state that their minimum
wage requirement exceeds their last wage while less than one—third of the
unemployed are willing to accept a wage reduction of 10 percent or more.
The Labor Department's own analysis of the questionnaire emphasizes
the willingness of some of the unemployed to accept low wages but says nothing
about the high relative reservation wage required by a substantial group. Thus
theLabor Department study notesthat"about 1out of 5 (unemployed) were
willingtoaccept less than $2.30 an hour (the minimum wage level in May 1976)"
and that "in contrast, only 1 out of 10 of the employed who were paid on an
hourly basis reported such low earnings" (Rosenfeld, 1977, p. 39). In the same
vein, that study reports that "only 6 percent of the unemployed were asking$7
anhour or more, the earnings reported by11 percentof employed workers"
(Rosenfeld, 1977,pp. 39—t0).—11—
In addition to ignoring the high side of the distribution of reser-
vation wages, the Labor Department's comparisons ignore the differences between
the potential wages of the unemployed and the actual wages of the employed.
Indeed, the Labor Department's report itself cautions that the employed and
unemployed have vastly different demographic characteristics and work experience
thatriaketheir own comparisons potentially- very misleading.
Otherresearchers have sought to reduce this problem of noncom—
parability by relating each individual's reservation wage to the wage predicted
for an employedindividualwith the same demographic characteristics andlabor
forceexperience.1There is, however, strong reason to believe that the
unemployeddiffer from the employed in systematic ways thatare not recorded in
thesurvey questionnaire but that influence both the probability of unemployment
and the potential wage. Workers of higher "quality" (in a sense thatcan be
observed by employers or prospective employers but that isnot recorded in the
survey)are nore likely to be employed and, if' employ-ed,to earn a higher wage.
Comparing the reservation wage of' an unemployed worker to the wage predicted
froma regression equation estimated with a sample of employed workers is thus
likely to understate the ratio of the reservation wage to the true potential
wage.
We avoid the "unobserved quality" bias by comparing each individual's
reported wage to his own past wage. Even this is subject to problems. For job
losers, our reservation wage ratio is likely to understate the ratio of the
reservation wage to the true potential wage for the reasons discussed in
1See, for example, the studies by Baron and Mellow(1978, 1981) and
Warner, Poindexter, and Fearn (1980).—12—
section 1.For example, an individual who was overpaid on his previous job,
i.e., whose wage exceeded his marginal product, is more likely to have become
unemployed. Similarly, individuals are likely to become unemployed when a
reduction in the demand for a product causes a fall in the individual's marginal
revenue product. In contrast, for individuals who quit their last job, the pre—
vious wage may understate the wage that the individual might reasonably hope to
receive. Anindividualmayquitbecause he believes that he is in a job that
does not pay him the value of his marginal product or that does not permit him
to be as productive as he might be in some other occupation or firi. Our analy-
sis therefore presents separate information for job losers and job leavers.
Although our primary concern is with the distribution of reservation
wages and the relative frequency with which reservation wages exceed previous
wages, we begin in Table 1 by examining the mean reservation wage ratios for
different groups of unemployed workers.
The first line of Table 1 presents the reservation wage ratio for all
unemployed individuals in our sample grouped by the number of weeks that they
had already been unemployed at the time of the survey. For the sample asa
whole, the mean ratio of the reservation wage to the wage on the last job was
1.01, implying that on average the unemployed are seeking a wage that is higher
than the wage that they received on their last job. The reservationwage ratio
declines with the duration of the unemployment spell but the differences are
not large.1 Even among individuals who have been unemployed for six ntrnths
'Several earlier studies found thatthe reservation wages of individual
employees declined with the time that they remained unemployed, e.g.,
Kasper (1967), Keifer and Neumann (1979), and Holt (1970).— 13-
Save for 'Jhble 1—14-.
orlonger, the mean reservation wage ratio is not significantly different from
1,2 one.
Eliminating individuals who voluntarily left their previous job and
focusing on job losers shows very similar results (line 2 of Table 1). The
overall mean reservation wage ratio for this group is 1.03 and declines slightly
from 1.06 among those unemployed less than five weeks to 1.0 at 20 weeks and
0.97 after a year. Lines 3 and 4 divide the job losers into those who are on
layoff expecting to return to their original job and those who have no expec-
tation of returning. The group on layoff reports a mean reservation 'wage ratio
ofapproximately 1.0 at all durations while the"other job losers"report reser-
vation wagesthat on average decline from 1.1 times their past wage during the
first four weeks of unemployment to about equal to their last wage after six
months and about 10 percent below their last wage after a year. Although the
decline of 17 percent in the reservation wage is quite significant, it is even
more striking that these job losers began with reservation wages that on average
were 10 percent above their last wage and only reached their last wage after six
months without work. As expected, the job leavers (line 5) have even higher
aspirations which decline only slowly with the length of the spell of unemployment.
1The standard errors of the mean ratios are approximately 0.03 for most of
the ratios in Table 1. Some of the means refer to relatively small numbers
of individuals (e.g., the mean corresponding to 15 to 19 weeks) and are
subject to standard errors that are approximately twice as great.
2These figures underestimate slightly the extent of the decline in the
reservation wage when inflation is raising all wages. In 197() wages were
rising at the rate of about 0.6 percent per month. An individual who is
unemployed for five months might ceteris paribus expect a wage that is three
percent higher than his last wage. This is offset to the extent that indi-
vidual skills decay with extended unemployment and that individuals who
experience longer periods of unemployment uay on average be of lower
"quality" relative to their previous wage than individuals who have had only
a short spell of unemployment. Adjusting the figures in Table 1 for inflation
would imply a stronger negative relation between the reservation wage and
unemployment.—15—
The last three relate the reservation wage to the highest wage that
the individual earned on any job after January l9T4. For some individuals, the
last job was a temporary job with a relatively low wage which provides a poor
standard of comparison. For such individuals, the highest wage since January
197I is a better measure of the potential wage and may even, because of the
passage of time, represent an underestimate of the potential wage in 1916. For
others, however, the highest earnings in the past two years may represent a tem-
porary job with abnormally high wages that reflect the temporary character of
the position.
The mean reservation wage ratios based on the highest previous wage
are only a few percent below the reservation wage ratios based on the last job.
For all unemployed persons in the sample, the mean is 1.00 in comparison to the
1.07 based on the last wage. For job losers the mean is 0.98, or five percent
below the 1.03 for this group based on the last wage. In short, even when the
reservation wage is related to the highest past wage the mean reflects no
willingness to reduce wages and implies that there is a significant group that
is seeking a higher wage than they have had before.
Table 2 shows the nature of this distribution of relative reservation
wages explictly. Among all of the unemployed individuals in our sample (line
i), only 2I percent indicated that they would accept a wage less than 90 percent
of their last wage. An additional 11 percent were willing to accept between 90
percent and 100 percent of their previous wage. This is shown as the cuuiula—
tive 35percentcorresponding to a reservation wage of less than 1.0. Thus
only about one-third of the unemployed were willing to accept any wage reduction
at all.
A further 27 percent indicated that they would accept any wage equal
to or greater than their last wage but nothing less, thereby bringing the curnula——16—
Save for Table 2—17--
tive percentage of the reservation wage ratio less than or equal to 1 to 62 per-
cent. Thus, 38 percent of the unemployed had a reservation wage greater than
their previous earnings. Only about one—fourth of those who required a wage
increase said they would accept an increase of less than 10 percent. The cumu—
lative proportion below a reservation wage ratio of LI was thus 0.72. Fully 28
percent of the unemployed said they would only return to work if they received a
wage that was 10 percent higher than their previous wage.
The large percentage of the unemployed who require wage increases to
accept new employment is characteristic of both job losers and job leavers.
Line 2 shows that only 41 percent of job losers would accept a reduction from
their last wage and that 24 percent say they would not accept a job unless it
paid at least 10 percent more than their last job. The percentage requiring a
wage increase is even higher for job leavers (line 5).
Lines 6 through 8 repeat the analysis with the reservation wage rela-
tive to the highest previous wage. Even among the job losers, only 48 percent
say they will accept any reduction in pay at all while 20 percent say they
require a wage that is at least 10 percent higher than their highest previous
wage.
Thefinal three lines restrict the sample to individuals between the
ages of 25and 55.Thisexcludes the young people and those near retirement,
twogroupsthat nayhaveweaker labor force attachment and therefore relatively
higher reservation wages. But even inthisage group, the meanreplacementwage
ratio is virtually one (0.99forall unemployed and 0.98forjoblosers)and
less than half oftheunemployed indicate a willingness to accept any wage
reduction.—18—
Animportant reason for the high reservation wage ratios and the high
fraction of individuals who require a wage increase as a condition of'
reemployment is the system of unemployment insurance benefits. Before pre-
senting the evidence for this conclusion in sections 5 and 6, we turn in the
next section to consider the implications of the high reservation wage ratios
for the general problem of measuring unemployment.
..TheMeasurement of Unemployment
TheDepartment of Labor does not consider everyone who isnotworking
tobe unemployed. An individual is officially classified as unemployed only if
he is available for work and has n.de specific efforts to find a job within the
past four weeks. The purpose of this standard is to count as unemployed only
those who really want to work but are unable to find a "suitable" job.
But as we noted in the introduction to this paper, no limit is placed
on the individual's reservation wage in defining his willingness to work and
therefore his unemployment status. No nEtter hov high or infeasible the
individual's reservation wage i.y be, he is classified as unemployed if within
four weeks he did athing to find employment, including asking friends or rela-
tives about jobs, checking with a private or public agency or answering
newspaper ads.
It is interesting to consider what happens to the measured
unemployment rate if we excludeindividuals with "unreasonably" high reservation
wages. InMay 1976, theoverall unemployment rate was6.7 percent.Individuals
classified as job losers and job leavers accounted for L.2 percentage points or
a little less thantwo—thirds of total unemployment. Inthe sample that we ana—
lyzed inthe previous section, only 35 percent of job losers and leavers mdi——19--
cated a willingness to work for less than their last pay. If we defined an
individual as unemployed only if he is willing to accept a wage that is lower
than his last wage, 59 percent of those who are currently classified as
unemployed job losers and 68 percent of job leavers would be reclassified and no
longer counted as unemployed. The .2 percent of the labor force that is
classified as unemployed job losers and leavers would be reduced to 1.6 percent
and the overall unemployment rate would fall from 6. percent to 14.1 percent.
This sharp reduction in the defined rate of unemployment occurs without any
reexamination of the reservation wages of those who are classified as new
entrants or reentrants.
A weaker standard of reclassification continues to regard as
unemployed anyone whose reservation wage does not actually exceed his past wage
even though he is not willing to reduce his wage at all. Among job losers, 31
percent would be reclassified by this standard because their reservation wage
ratio exceeded their last wage; among job leavers, 1.2 percent would be
reclassified. The result would be a 1.14 percentage point reduction in the
unemployment rate to 5.3 percent. Again, this 20 percent reduction in the
unemployment rate occurs without any reclassification of the new entrants and
reentrants.
An even weaker standard accepts as unemployed anyone whose reservation
wage does not exceed 110 percent of his last wage. Even this very weak standard
eliminates more than one—fourth of job losers and leavers and therefore reduces
the unemployment rate to 5.6 percent.
Table 3 presents the official May 1976 unemployment rates for the
population as a whole and for several desographic groups and compares these
official rates with two alternative "adjusted" unemployment rates. The
"adjustedrate 1" figures excludefrom the unemployed that shareof the—20--
Save for Table 3—21—
losers and leavers who reported reservation wages 1.10 or more times their last
wage.The "adjusted rate 2" figures exclude that share of the losers and
leavers whose reservation wage ratioexceeds 1.0.No figures are presented for
the more stringent criterion that classifies an individual as unemployed only if
he is willing to accept less than his previous wage.
The adjusted rate 2 figures indicate, as we noted in the previous
paragraph, that reclassifying anyone who wants a wage increase in his previous
wage reduces measured unemployment by more than one—fifth. The nist striking
difference among the subgroups is the small effect of reclassification on teen-
agers. Since teenage unemployment includes many more new entrants and
reentrants, reclassification on the basis of previous wages is quite limited.
5. The Reservation Wage Equation: Specification and Previous Research
We turn now to examine the extent to which the level of unemployment
insurance benefits raises the level of reservation wages and the probability
that the individual's reservation wage ratio will exceed one. In the theory of
search unemployment, the individual's reservation wage is a decreasing function
of the cost of remaining unemployed and therefore an increasing function of the
ratio of unemployment benefits to previous wages.1
Although unemployment benefit rules differ among states, the typical
benefit fornula provides that an unemployed worker gets basic weekly benefits
equal to about half of his previous gross weekly earnings, subject to a maximum
'The importance of unemployment insurance as a cause of higher reservation
wages and a longer duration of search is discussed in Feldstein (1913a,b) and
developed in formal nde1s by Baily (1977, 1978), Mortenson (1977) and IIirdett
('979).—22—
weeklyamount that is a binding constraint for a minority of beneficiaries. In
addition, about one—third of the labor force lives in states that provide addi-
tionalbenefits for dependents. Unemployment benefits are subject to federal
income tax only when family income exceeds $25,000 for a couple filing a joint
return or $20,000 for a single person filing an individual return; even in these
households,half of' unemploymentbenefits are excluded in calculating taxable
income.1Unemployment benefits are also not subject to payroll tax or to state
income tax.2 Unemployment benefits therefore typically replace about two—thirds
ofrecipients' lost net income.3
Earlier studies, although not dealing directly with the reservation
wageratio, indicate that higher levels of unemployment insurance benefits do
increase reservation wages. Warner, Poindexter and Fearn (1980) use the 1910
Census Employment Survey and relate the job—seekers reported reservation wage to
the itrket wage predicted for someone with those demographic characteristics and
to a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual receives unemployment
insurance benefits. The receipt of unemployment benefits raises the reservation
wage by 8.6percent(with a standard error of' 1.opercent.)There is no inf or—
mation on the amount of benefits or on the ratio of the reservation wage to the
individual's previous wage.
Fishe (1982) studies a group of job seekers in Florida for whom data
are available on individual attributes and on the nErket wage of' the job that
No federal tax was levied on unemployment insurance in 191
2Soine states levy a tax on the federal income tax base or a tax that is
proportional to the federal tax payments. In either of these cases, unem-
ployment benefits are subject to partial taxation at the state level.
3See Feldsteiri (l971) for a detailed analysis of unemployment insurance
replacementrates.—23—
the individual takes at the end of the unemployment spell. Although there is no
reported information on reservation wages, Fishe uses a censored regression
model to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of a reservation wage equation.
He concludes that unemployment insurance raises the reservation wage and that
the reservation wage varies inversely with the remaining length of the period
for which benefits will still be paid.
The final study of unemployment insurance and reservation wages of
whichwe are aware is the research by Pucher and Harrison (1915) who report
regression equations based on the 1970 Census Employment Survey. They focus on
inner city workers and relate the observed reservation wage to a predicted
potential wage (based on the job seeker's demographic characteristics) and
dumjr variables indicating whether the individual received a small or large
amount of unemployment insurance benefits in the previous year. Since these
unemploymentinsurance variables reflect the duration of unemployment but refer
toa different period, it is difficult to know how their positive coefficients
should be interpreted.
In short, while the previous studies suggest that unemployment
insurance raises reservation wages, none of these studies actually uses data on
either the ratio of unemployment benefits to wages or on the ratio of the reser-
vation wage to the individual's previous wage. The present study therefore aims
at a more explicit evaluation of the effect of unemployment insurance by
relating the reservation wage ratio to the unemployment insurance replacement
rate. We also give particular attention to the effect of unemployment insurance
on the probability that an individual's reservation wage will exceed the wage
(or 1.1 times the wage) that he earned on his last job.214
Our unemployment insurance variable is the ratio of the weekly bene-
fits received by the individual during the current spell of unemployment to the
net wage that he earned on his last job. It would in principle be desirable to
calculate the marginal income tax rate for each person in our sample and to use
that tax rate to calculate the ratio of U.I. benefits to previous net earnings.
Because the data required to calculate each individual's marginal tax rate are not
available for our sample, we have assumed a common marginal tax rate of 30 percent.
Because we do not recognize differences in marginal tax rates, our
measure of the U.I. replacement ratio understates the replacement ratio for indi-
viduals with high marginal tax rates and overstates the replacement ratio for
individuals with low marginal tax rates. Since individuals with high marginal
tax rates are likely to be individuals with high wage rates and therefore lower
than average U.I. replacement ratios,' our procedure generally understates the low
replacement rates and overstates the high replacement rates.
An example will illustrate the nature of this bias. Consider a low
wage individual who earns $200 a week, receives benefits of $100 a week and
pays a marginal tax rate of 25 percent. We measure his replacement rate as $100
divided by 70 percent of $200 or 0.71; in reality his replacement rate is $100
divided by 75 percent of $200 or 0.67. A high wage individual earns $1400 a
week, receives benefits of $150 a week and pays a nRrginal tax rate of 35 per-
cent. We nasure his replacement rate as $150 divided by $2d0 or 0.514 when the
correct measure is 0.58. Thus our replacement rates stand in the ratio of 0.71
to 0.514 or 1.31 while the "true" replacement rates stand in the ratio of 0.67
1Recallthat benefits are generally proportional to wagesup to some maximum
weeklybenefit.—25—
to 0.58 or 1.16.
Theresult of exaggerating the variation in the measured U.I. replacement
rate while keeping the mean unchanged is to bias its estimated coefficient in a
regression equation toward zero.1 In addition, any purely random errors in the
U.I. replacement rate introduced by our procedure will cause a further downward bias
of the usual errors in variables type. For both reasons, therefore, our proce-
dure is likely to underestimate the effect of any changes in unemployment benefits.
We have already described the measurement of the dependent variable of
our analysis, the reservation wage ratio. We use the ratio of the individual's
stated reservation wage to the wage that he earned on his last job. The other
variables in our reservation wage equation are of two kinds:(1) measures of
other income during unemployment that might raise the reservation wage and
(2) demographic variables that mightinfluencethe reservation wage directly and
that are included in the equation as a precaution.
The survey provides information on total nonwage income during the
previous month, an amount that includes not only a small amount of interest and
dividends but also the value of unemployment benefits, welfare, disability
payments, food stamps, etc. We subtract from this an estimate of the
unemployment benefits received during that month and divide the differences by
the wage on the last job. We refer to this as the Nonwage Income Fatio and
expect that it will increase the individual's reservation wage ratio.
1This is seen most easily in a bivariate regression ofanydependentvariable
on the U.I. replacement rate. The regression coefficient is the ratio of the
covariance between the variables to the variance of the U.I. replacement rate.
Increasing the variance of the replacement rate by a factor of A increases
the covariance bynd therefore reduces the regression coefficient to
1/ A times its true value.—26-.
Since data are not available on the amount of supplementary
unemployment benefits, welfare, and other forms of nonwage incoiie, it is not
possible to measure their specific effects on reservation wages. information is
available, however, on whether or not the individual received welfare payments
or supplementary unemployment benefits. We include binary variables for these
two income sources (which take the value of 1 if that type of income is received
and zero otherwise) and regard their coefficients as a weak indication of
whether each type of income affects the reservation wage ratio in a different
way from other forms of nonwage income. In virtually every equation, the coef-
ficients of these variables are negligible, suggesting that the distinction among
these income sources does not matter. We would emphasize, however, that this is
a very weak test of whether different types of income have different effects on
reservation wage ratios.
The survey also provides information on whether another worker is pre-
sent in the household. The presence of such a worker provides additional income
which makes finding a job less urgent than it would otherwise be. Such income
is, however, very different from unemployment insurance or other employment—
conditioned transfers; an additional worker in the household has an income
effect but does not change the cost of unemployment and therefore has no substi-
tution effect. We would expect the effect of this variable to be positive but
• 1
small and that is generally what we find.
Closely related to the possibility of additional family income is the
extent of the individual's family responsibility. We add a binary variable that
is equal to one if the individual is a married man. Since 'we are controlling
f or the presence of an additional worker, the coefficient of the married nan
1Thepresence of another worker during an unemployment spell may not be
exogenous but a response to the unemployment.—21—
variable represents a negative income effect and should be expected to reduce
the reservation wage if it has any noticeable effect at all.
Four other demographic variables are included in the equation without
any clear a priori expectation about the likely direction of their effect on the
reservation wage ratio. They are included because of the possibility that they
might have an effect and might be correlated with the unemployment insurance
replacement ratio. These variables are the individual's age in years, the race
of the individual (a binary variable equal to one if the individual is white),
the sex of the individual (a binary variable equal to one for males) and the
number of years of schooling that the individual has had.'
6. Estimated Effects of Unemployment Insurance on the Reservation Wage Ratio
Table 1 presents estimated coefficients for the specification
discussed in the last section. Separate equations are estimated for individuals
classified as "job losers on layofft', "other job losers," and "job leavers."
Only individuals who received unemployment insurance are included in the sample
because of the difficulties and ambiguities associated with the non—receipt of
benefits. 2
The coefficient of the unemployment compensation variable is positive
and significantly different from zero in all three equations, implying that a
higher unemployment insurance replacennt rate raises the reservation wage
1We have also included the level of the individual's previouswage. The coef-
ficient of this variable is generally insignificant and its presence does not
alter the estimated effect of the U.I. replacement rate.
hen the sample is expanded to include nonrecipients of unemployment
compensation, the coefficient of the unemployment insurance variable
is generally not significantly different from zero. See section 2 for a
discussion of the difficulties of interpreting the absence of benefits. The
exclusion of nonrecipients is the primary reason why the regression sample is
61&2 instead of the 2228 observations in the tables.—28.-
Save for Table—29--
ratio. The coefficient of 0.129 for job losers on layoff implies that
increasing the unemployment insurance replacement rate from Q•14 to 0.7 raises
the reservation wage ratio bypercentage points for someone in this group.
The effect is substantially larger for job losers who are not on layoff; an
increase in the U.I. replacement rate from o.1 to 0.7 raises their reservation
wage by nore than 12 percentage points. Before discussing the implication of
these figures for the duration of unemployment or the effect of unemployment
insurance on the probability that the reservation wage ratio exceeds 1.0 or 1.1,
we comment briefly on the other coefficients in Table 4.
Agreater amount of nonwage income relative to the individual's last
wage raises the reservation wage ratio for both groups of job losers but not for
job leavers. Since only some of this nonwage income is conditional on continued
unemployment, the effect is substantially smaller than that of the unemployment
insurance benefits.
The coefficients of the duninr variables for the receipt of welfare and
of supplementary unemployment insurance are generally insignificant, indicating
that these forms of nonwage income did not affect reservation wages differently
than other forms of nonwage income (except unemployment insurance). The excep-
tion is for the group of job losers who are not on layoff. In this group, the
receipt of welfare and supplementary benefits appears to raise reservation wages
more than other forms of nonwage income.
The presence of a second worker in the household has only an income
effect and therefore is expected to have a weaker impact on the reservation wage
ratio than unemployment insurance. Although the coefficient is positive in two
of the three equations, it is never statistically significant. This and the
evidence on nonwage income both indicate that unemployment insurance is impor——30—
tant because it affects the cost of continued unemployment (a substitution
effect) and not just because it increases the individual!s financial resources.
The duinny variable for married men reinforces this conclusion. The
negative coefficient reflects the adverse "income effect" of additional spending
responsibilities but the small size and lack of statistical significance
reflects the unimportance of income effects relative to substitution effects.
None of the four demographic variables had a statistically significant
coefficient. Equations were also estimated with more detailed demographic spe-
cification (e.g., a set of binary variables for age) but these specifications
did not add significantly to the explanatory power of the equation or change
the coefficient of the unemployment insurance variable to any appreciable extent.
In the next section we show that the duration of unemployment is
likely to increase in a very nonlinear way with the reservation wage ratio.
Increasing the reservation wage ratio from 0.8 to 0.9 has a much smaller effect
on the duration of unemployment than increasing the reservation wage ratio from
1.0 to 1.1. Since the median reservation wage ratio is 1.0, the estimated
effect of unemployment insurance presented in Table )4 implies that the changes
in the reservation wage caused by unemployment insurance can have a very
substantial effect on the probability that the reservation wage exceeds 1.0 or
1.1 and therefore on the likely duration of unemployment.
The specification of the equation in Table 1 assumes a linear rela—
tionship between the unemployment insurance ratio and the reservation wage
ratio. We have also included a quadratic term in the U.I. ratio but found that
its coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient of
the quadratic term is however generally positive, suggesting that high U.I.—31—
ratios have a disproportionately large effect on the reservation wage ratio.
Asa further check on the effect ofunemployment insurance on the
likelihoodofhigh reservation wage ratios, we have used the specification of
Table 4 to study directly the probability that an individual's reservation wage
ratioexceeds 1.0 or 1.1.The dependent variables in the "greater than 1.0"
regressions is one ifthe individual's reservation wageratio exceeds 1.0 and
zerootherwise. Table5 summarizesthe effect of the unemployment insurance
ratio on thesereservation wage probabilities for the three unemployment groups.
Onlythe coefficient of the U.I. ratio variable is presented although each coef-
ficientis taken from a full specification like those of Table 14•The other
coefficients are qualitatively very similar to those of Table 4, indicating weak
income effects and virtually no differences among demographic groups. The mean
of the dependent variable and the R2 value for the equation as a whole are also
presented.
In each case, the coefficient of the unemployment insurance variable
is large and statistically significant, indicating a substantial effect of
unemployment insurance on the probability that the unemployed individual will
have a high reservation wage. Consider, for example, the group of job losers on
layoff. The average ratio of unemployment insurance benefits to the previous
net wage for this group is 0.66 and 31 percent of the group have reservation
wages above the wage on their last job. Reducing all unemployment insurance
ratios in this group by 0.21 would reduce the 31 percent with high reservation
wages to 23 percent. Completely eliminating the unemployment insurance reduces
the mean probability of a reservation wage greater than 1 by 0.10 (0.66) =0.264
to o.ob6.
1This reduction is approximately equivalent to taxing unemployment benefits.—32—
Savefor Thble 5.—33—
7.UnemploymentInsurance, Reservation Wages and the Duration of Unemployment
By raising the reservation wage, high unemployment insurance benefits
increase the expected duration of' unemployment. Because the relationship bet-
ween the reservation wage and the expected duration of unemployment is very
nonlinear, the effect of unemployment insurance is particularly important when
it raises the reservation wage above the wage that the individual earned on his
previous job.1
Although we lack sufficient information to do a complete analysis of
theeffect of unemployment insurance on expected durations of unemployment, it is
useful to examine the implications ofasimple model that illustrates the non-
linear characterof the effect of unemployment insurance and of reservation 'wage
ratios.
Assume that each individual who becomes unemployed adopts a reser-
vation wage (R) that reflects his unemployment benefits, his previous wage
(w0) and other factors that influence his expectations about the distribution
of potential wage offers [f(w)]. Assume furtherthat theindividual then
receiveswage offers (w) that representrandom drawings from this distribution
ofpotential wage offers and acceptsthe first offer that exceeds his reser-
vation wage. Themodel simplifies reality by assuming that the individual does
'Weare aware that several past investigations (e.g., Baron and Mellow, 1981)
have failed to find a significant relationship between reported reservation
wages and subsequent labor market experience. The theoretical relationship is
unambiguous and several explanations may be proposed for the lack of an
observed relationship. For example, other job attributes may induceworkers to
settlefor wages below their stated reservation wage. Alternatively, workers
may revise their reservation wages in response to information obtained 'while
unemployed.—34—
not revise his reservation wage over time1 and that wage offers arrive in random
order.2
In such a nxdel, the probability (P) that the individual accepts each




If wage offers are received every t days, the expected duration of unemployment
CE) is E =t/P.For the normal distribution, or for any distribution in which
the "tails" have less density per unit of w than the center of the distribution,
P will vary with R in a very nonlinear way. The higher the value of R, the
greater the proportional change in P per unit change in R.3 Since the expected
duration of unemployment is inversely proportional to the acceptance probabi-
lity, the sensitivity of the expected duration of unemployment to the value of R
is an increasing function of R.
This idea can be illustrated by assuming that the distribution of
potential wage offers is normal. The further assumption that the mean of the
potential wage offers for an unemployed individual is the wage on his last job
is a conservative one since the true mean is probably lower (for the reasons
discussed in section 1) and the assumption of a higher mean increases the pro—
individual who is unsure about the parameters of f(w) will use his wage
offers to revise his subjective estimates of these parameters and will alter his
reservation wage as his estimates of these parameters change.
2Th1s precludes a search strater in which the individual ranks firms by the
expected prevailing wage and applies for employment in decreasing order of this
potential wage.
3This property holds for a much wider class of distributions. Even if the
probability P varies linearly with R (as it would for a uniform distribution),
the expected deviation varies inversely with P and is therefore a nonlinear
function of R.—35—
babilityof acceptance for every reservation wage level and thus reduces the
sensitivity of the expected duration to unemployment insurance. Since the stan-
dard deviation of the potential wage offer distribution is not known, we will
present estimates conditional on a variety of plausible values.
Before looking at these estimates, it is useful to examine oneexample
in detail. Consider an individual who is an unemployed job loser who is not on
layoff, who receives U.I. benefits that replace 70 percent of his previous net
wage, and whose reservation wageis1.1 times the wage on his last job. Assume
that the mean of his potential wage offer distribution is the wage on his last
job and the standard deviation of that distribution is 10 percent of the mean.
Thus the individual's probability of receiving a wage offer as high as his
reservation wage is equal to the probability of exceeding the mean of the offer
distribution by one standard deviation and is thus 1 —F(l.0)o.i6 when F()
is the cumulative normal distribution rith mean zero and standard deviation 1.
The reservation wage ratio equation for "other job losers" presented
in Table 1 implies that each additional 10 percentage points of the U.I. replace-
ment ratio raises the reservation wage ratio by 14.2 percentage points. Thus
lowering the individual's U.I. replacement ratio from 0.7 to 0.5 would reduce his
reservation wage ratio from 1.10 to 1.02. The probability of receiving an
acceptable wage would rise to 1 —F(0.2)=0.142.The expected duration would
fall from t/o,i6 to t/0.142 or to 38 percent of its previous value. This figure
isshown in Table 6inthe row correspondingto aninitial reservation wage
ratio of 1.1(thesecond row) and in the column corresponding to the standard
deviationequal to 10 percentof the mean and the reduction in the U.I. ratio from
0.7to 0.5 (column 7).
More generally, Table 6 shows the effect of reducing the U. I. replace-
ment ratio on the probability of receiving an acceptable wage offer and on the—36—
Savefor Thble 6—37—
expected duration of unemployment. The figures refer to "job losers not on
layoff" and use the U.I. ratio coefficient of 0.1i6 presented in Table )4forthis
group. Although similar calculations could be done for workers on layoff and
for job leavers, the principal effect of iLl. on job search relates to job
losers who are not on layoff.
The first column shows the initial reservation wage ratio. The next
three columns show the acceptance probabilities corresponding to those reser-
vation wage ratios if the standard deviation of wage offers is 5 percent of the
mean value (column 2), 10 percent (column 3) and 15 percent (column ).The
next group of columns correspond to the effect of reducing the unemployment
insurance ratio from 0.7 to 0.5. The first of these columns shows the new
reservation wage ratio predicted to result from the reduced unemployment
insurance ratio. For each alternative standard deviation, the next 3 columns
then show the new relative duration of unemployment, i.e., the ratio of the
expectedduration with a U.I. replacement ratio of 0.5 to the expected duration
with a U.I. ratio of 0.7. The final four columns then repeat the analysis for a
reduction in the U.I. ratio from 0.7to 03.
Thefigures in columns 6,7and 8 showthat reducing the U.I.ratio from
0.7 to 0.5 hasa very substantialeffect on the expected duration of
unemploymentfor those individuals whose reservation wage would otherwise equal
or exceed their previous wage. Even someone whose reservation wage ratio is
reduced from 1.0 to 0.92 will experience a 37percentdecrease in expected
unemploymenttime ifthe standard deviation is equal to ten percent of the zran
wage offer.
Doublingthe decrease in the U.I. ratio (i.e., decreasing it from 0.7 to
0.3 instead of from 0.7 to 0.5) has a less than proportional effect on the
expected duration. For example, with a starting reservation wage ratio of 1.1—38—
and a standard deviation of 0.15, the probability of an acceptable wage offer is
0.25 and therefore the expected duration of unemployment is .0 times the inter-
val between wage offers. Reducing the U.I. replacement rate from 0.7 to 0.5
lowers the reservation wage ratio to 1.02 and increases the probability of an
acceptable wage offer to 0.L5. This reduces the expected duration of
unemployment to 2.2 times the wage offer interval, or 56 percent of its previous
value. A further reduction in the U.I. ratio to 0.3 lowers the reservation wage
ratio to 0.93 and thus increases the probability of an acceptable wage offer to
0.68. The expected duration of unemployment falls to 1.5 times the wage offer
interval or 37 percent of its initial value. Thus the first 20 percentage point
reduction in the U.I. replacement ratio implied a 4 percent reduction in the
expected duration while the additional 20 percentage point reduction in the U.I.
1
ratio reduced expected duration by only 19 percent of its original value.
In addition to this analysis of the expected duration of unemployment,
it isparticularly interesting to examine the effect of unemployment insurance
on the probability of long durations of unemployment.Consider an individual
who,with a U.I. replacementratio of 0.7,has a reservation wage that is 1.1
timeshis previous wage. Table 6 shows that if the standard deviation of wage
offers is 10 percent of his previous wage, the probability that each wage offer
is acceptable is 0.1587. Although the expected duration of unemployment is 6.3
times the interval between wage offers, the probability that the individual will
1The nonlinearity of this relation reflects the linearity of the specification
in Table 1. If the sensitivity of the reservation wage to the unemployment
insurance ratio were a rapidly decreasing function of the U.I. ratio, the reduc-
tions in low U.I. rates could have a nre powerful effect. Estimates of the
nonlinear generalization of the equations in Table b indicate that nonlinear
specifications are not statistically better and that the direction of nonli-
nearity actually reinforces the conclusion in the text by showing that the sen-
sitivity of the reservation wage is greater at higher levels of the U.I. ratio.—4 1—
itself 1.0, even small changes in the reservationwage can have a substantial
impact on unemployment.
The analysis of section 6 shows that the level of unemployment bene-
fits relative to previous wages has a powerful effect on the individual'sreser-
vation wage. A 10 percent increase in the U.I. replacement ratio increases the
reservation wage by aboutpercent for job losers who are not on layoff and by
somewhat less for other unemployed groups. Separate regressions toanalyze
the high reservation wage per se show that a 10 percent increase in the U.I.
replacement ratio also increases by about four percentage points the probability
that an unemployed individual will require awage increase of 10 percent or
more.
The estimates that we have presented imply that reducing unemployment
insurance benefits could significantly lower theaverage duration of
unemploymentand the relative number oflong—duration spells of unemployment.
Becauseof the nonlinear response of the unemployment duration to the reser-
vation wage, reducing a high unemployment insurance ratio by 10percentage
points is likely to have a greater impact on unemployment than reducing a low
unemployment insurance ratio by 10 percentagepoints.
Taxing unemployment benefits in the same way that earnings are taxed
wouldreduce net unemployment insurance by about 30 percent although the reduc-
tion would be much smaller for individuals with low overall annual income.The
typical U.I. ratio would decline from about 0.7 to 0.5. Since such a reduction
in the U.I. ratio implies a reduction in the reservationwage ratio of more than
10 percentage points, the implied impact on totalunemployment and on relatively
long durations of unemployment would be very substantial.
The May 1976 survey is currently a unique source of data onreser-
vation wages and unemployment insurance. It would obviously be valuableto have—12—
a replication of that surveyunder differenteconomic conditions. In such a
replication, it wouldbeuseful to collect sore information on the individuals
who do not receive unemployment insurance and the reasons why they do not. With
the existing data, a possible next step would be an analysis that explicitly
links the observed durations of unemployment to the reservation wage in the
framework of a model with time—varying reservation wages.
Theoptimal level of unemployment benefits for job seekersdepends on
abalance between protection and distortion: protection against the discomfort
of reduced consumption during unemployment and distortion of the duration of
unemployment. Theresearchpresented in this paper suggests that a constant
level of unemployment benefits for an individual maynotbe optimal. Instead,
benefitsmight be varied over time to offset the effect of excessive reservation
wages. In particular, it is possible to learn something about the individual's
unobserved reservation wage y the anunt of time that he has remained
unemployed. A long—spell of unemployment reflects combinations of a high reser-
vation wage and/or a string of unlucky wage offers. More forniaU,y, the likeli-
hood function of the individual's reservation wage can be inferred from the
observed duration of unemployment if the distribution of wage offers is known.
This suggests that the optimal U.I. benefit might, ceteris paribus, be a
decreasing function of the duration of the unemployment spell. The formal solu-
tion to this problem remains to be investigated.1
1The optimal relationship between U.I. benefits and the duration of
unemployment should also reflect the fact that longer spellsimpose a greater
financial hardship. A "deductible" in the form ofawaiting period or a con-
tinuouslyvarying replacement ratio nay thereforebe optimal.—13—
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CumulatIve Distribution of Reservation Wage Ratios
Proportion with Ratio
Line Unemployment Ratio of Mean Less Less Less than Less
Group Reservation than than or equal tothan
Wage to 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
I. All Unemployed
(job losers and Last Wage 1.07 0.24 0.35 0.62 0.72
I eavers)
2. Job Losers Last Wage 1.03 0.29 0.41 0.69 0.76
3. Job Losers
on layoff Last Wage 1.01 0.25 0.38 0.71 0.80
4. Other Job
Losers Last Wage 1.04 0.31 0.43 0.68 0.74
5. Job Leavers Last Wage 1.09 0.22 0.32 0.58 0.69
6. Al I UneTiployed Highest Wage 1.00 0.34 0.46 0.71 0.79
7. Job Losers Highest Wage 0.98 0.36 0.48 0.73 0.80
8. Job Leavers Highest Wage 1.04 0.28 0.39 0.65 0.76
9. All Unemployed
age 25—55 Last Wage 0.99 0.34 0.47 0.75 0.81
10. Job Losers
age 25—55 Last Wage 0.98 0.35 0.47 0.74 0.82
11. Job Leavers
age 25—55 Last Wage 1.02 0.31 0.44 0.73 0.81
Source: Authors' calculations based on May 1976 Job Search Questionnaire. See text for
description and definitions.Table 3
Unemployment Rates Adjusted for High Reservation Rates
Exclude Exclude
Share of Unemployment f ) 1.1 Wo Wo
Reported May 1976 Accounted for By Adjusted Adjusted
Group Unemployment Rate Losers and Leavers Rate 1* Rate 2*
Total 6.7 62.7 5.6 5.3
Males, age 20+ 5.3 79.2 4.3 4.0
Females, age 20+ 6.4 62.5 5.4 5.0
16—19year olds 16.8 31.0 15.7 15.2
Whites 6.1 63.9 5.1 4.8
Nonwhites 11.4 55•3 8.7 8.2
*
AdjustedRate I Is computed by excluding from the unemployment rate calculations
that share of the losers and leavers who reported reservation wages of 1.10 or
more times their last wage.
**
AdjustedRate 2 Is computed by excluding fran the unemployment rate calculation
that share of losers and leavers who reported reservation wagesabovetheir
I ast wage.
Source: Unemployment data from Employment and Earnings, June 1976, Table A—12.
Adjusiments based on author's calailations using Job SearchQuestionnaire
Data.Table 4
Effects of Unenployment Insurance and other Variables
on Reservation Wage Ratios
Variable Unemployment Group
JobLosers Other Job Job Leavers
on Layoff Losers
U.I.Replacement 0.129 0.417 0.294
Ratio (0.057) (0.070) (0.184)
Nonwage income 0.044 0.073 —0.004
RatIo (0.022) (0.024) (0.044)
Welfare —0.014 0.104 0.076
(0.042) (0.044) (0.107)
Supplementary
Unemployment —0.022 0.111 0.222
BenefIts (0.058) (0.059) (0.135)
Other Worker 0.041 —0.009 0.02 1
Present (0.031) (0.038) (0.082)
Married Man —0.042 —0.042 —0.054
(0.038) (0.044) (0.139)
Age —0.001 0.000 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
White —0.055 0.045 0.107
(0.046) (0.047) (0.104)
Male 0.051 0.020 0.073
(0.040) (0.047) (0.119)
Education —0.001 —0.002 —0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Constant 0.964 0.617 0.866
(0.108) (0.127) (0.312)
0.084 0.203 0.121
N 246 306 90
Mean of
Dependent Variable 1.025 1014 1.100
The dependent variable In eachequation is the ratio of the reservation wage to
the wage on the last Job. Standard errors are shown In parenthesis.Table 5
Effect of Unrpioyment Insurance on the Probability
of a Hl ReservationWage
Coefficientof Uneirqloyment Insurance Variable









Standard Error (0.108) (0.101)
2
R 0.099 0.105
Mean Proportion 0.30 0.24
JobLeavers
Coefficient 0.499 0.648
Standard Error (0.245) (0.214)
R2 0.155 0.171
Mean Proportion 0.33 0.26
Eachcoefficient is based on equations with the same specification as the
equationsin Table4.T
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